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The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe
Abstract

For the past decade, Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic decline that has resulted in an inflation
rate of 231 million percent and an unemployment rate of over 90 percent. Past research has concluded that the
economic decline of Zimbabwe has mainly been caused by poor monetary policies and failure of fiscal policies
to control the budget deficit. This research aimed to closely examine some of these policies that the
Zimbabwean government implemented, the effects of these policies on economic activity, employment and
inflation levels in the country. By interviewing many economic analysts in Zimbabwe, I managed to gather the
main causes of the country’s decline. In an effort to understand the effects of inflation on a country, I looked at
other developing countries that have survived similar economic challenges and assessed some of the steps
they took to overcome the challenges. From the research, I managed to conclude that although government
policies on agriculture, participation in armed conflicts, government spending and investment have been
weak, structural reforms can be successfully implemented to get the economy functioning again.
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THE ECONOMIC DECLINE OF ZIMBABWE
Chido Munangagwa
ABSTRACT
For the past decade, Zimbabwe has been experiencing an economic decline
that has resulted in an inflation rate of 231 million percent and an unemployment
rate of over 90 percent. Past research has concluded that the economic decline of
Zimbabwe has mainly been caused by poor monetary policies and failure of fiscal
policies to control the budget deficit. This research aimed to closely examine
some of these policies that the Zimbabwean government implemented, the effects
of these policies on economic activity, employment and inflation levels in the
country. By interviewing many economic analysts in Zimbabwe, I managed to
gather the main causes of the country’s decline. In an effort to understand the
effects of inflation on a country, I looked at other developing countries that have
survived similar economic challenges and assessed some of the steps they took to
overcome the challenges. From the research, I managed to conclude that although
government policies on agriculture, participation in armed conflicts, government
spending and investment have been weak, structural reforms can be successfully
implemented to get the economy functioning again.
INTRODUCTION
This paper evaluates the economic decline of the Zimbabwean economy
by a close examination of the country’s macro-economic policies and their
subsequent effects on the economy, the country’s GDP and output in the different
sectors of society. Zimbabwe’s economic decline since 1997, has seen the country’s
macro-economic condition deteriorate progressively into a hyperinflationary
environment. This has resulted in a unsustainable socio-economic conditions that
have forced 37.8 % of the population to migrate internationally (International
Organization for Migration 2008). I will analyze government policies that
were the main driving forces in the decline of the Zimbabwean economy while
simultaneously assessing the government’s argument that sanctions and drought
are the main contributors to the current state of the Zimbabwean economy.
The country’s economic problems go beyond macroeconomic policies,
but are reflective of a political impasse that has challenged the current government
of President Robert Mugabe. Since Independence, the Mugabe regime has tried
maintaining a one-party state, and has gained significant control of the country’s
main governing bodies, including the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. It is therefore
imperative to consider the political economy when looking at Zimbabwe as the
entanglement makes the Zimbabwean crisis solution even more complex. The
current economic crisis is above all a political problem, that is exacerbated by failed
policies. Currently, the Mugabe regime, is facing international condemnation and
pressure to relinquish their 30 year reign in power.
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Between now and Zimbabwe’s political solution, many short term
solutions can be put in place to transition into a new political and economic
leadership team. In this paper, I analyze the conditions that led Zimbabwe into
this state, and various solutions that a stable leadership body can implement.
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ZIMBABWE
During the pre-independence period, much of the country’s wealth was
in the hands of the white minority under the rule of Ian Smith who served as
Prime Minister of the British colony known as Rhodesia. The colonial period was
characterized by the following occurrences:
1. The occupation of land owned by local inhabitants and the relocation
of the black people to outlying communal lands. Land was taken from
black people without compensation and given to white veterans, many
of who were retired World War I soldiers. Blacks were forbidden to
own land in these fertile areas.
2.

Blacks were excluded from the political process.

3.

Black Zimbabweans were forbidden from the best schools and
residential areas in Rhodesia.

After 1965, the United Kingdom adopted a different policy towards
colonies. A few colonies such as Kenya had now gained independence, and
the British government adopted a policy of ‘No Independence Before Majority
African Rule (NIBMAR).’ The Rhodesian Front, the white regime run by Ian
Smith, rejected that policy and wanted to maintain governance over Rhodesia.
The Smith regime signed a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
1965 in opposition to black majority. The British government, the Commonwealth
and the United Nations condemned this action and declared it illegal. The United
Kingdom went on to impose economic sanctions on Rhodesia, as it viewed their
actions as racist. Smith argued that Rhodesia was no longer a British colony and
that it had gained independence from Britain, although power was not in the hands
of the black majority. South Africa and Portugal were the only two countries that
supported Rhodesia and no other country recognized Rhodesia as a state. On
the macro-economic level, these sanctions encouraged internal production and
a desire to achieve self-sustenance because many countries refused to trade with
Rhodesia. In the meantime, two political forces were growing within the black
majority – the Mugabe-led ZANU party, consisting of the majority Shona people,
and the ZAPU party headed by Joshua Nkomo, consisting of the minority Ndebele
people. Africans had always resisted European rulers and in Zimbabwe in 18961897, the first Chimurenga war had been fought. The locals had lost the war due
to a lack of sophisticated weapons.
From July 1964 to 1979, the Second Chimurenga war took place between
the white Rhodesians and the ZANU and ZAPU forces. This war, also known as
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the Rhodesia Bush War, was a struggle for liberation from the oppressive white
minority rule. With China and North Korea backing the ZANU forces, and the
Soviet Union and East Germany supporting the ZAPU faction, and with no
foreign support, the Rhodesian government was overthrown. Rhodesia gained its
independence in 1980 and was renamed Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe became the
first President of Zimbabwe since Independence to date. Zimbabwe achieved
majority rule in 1980, and the first decade after independence, the new government
focused on programs aimed at building the health and education sectors. The
economy continued to be run as in the pre-independence period, as a command
economy. The Zimbabwe government made it clear that the state was to play a
central role in the country’s economic and social development (UNDP Discussion
Document 2008). Although not high on a global scale, Zimbabwe’s growth rate
during the eighties was higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. With
the end of the liberation war, and good rainfall, farming output strongly boosted
Zimbabwe’s growth. In the 1980’s however, drought had a negative impact
on growth. The drought of 1982-3 was followed by another in 1987, when the
contribution of agriculture to GDP growth was negative.22 As the drought took
place, there was also a world recession that resulted in commodity export prices
decreasing. Because of these events, the government decided that it was time to
shift economic policies.
Since 1990, policy makers in Zimbabwe worked to liberalize the
economic system through the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP),
which allowed for an open market economy driven by a strong export base. The
main goals of this program were to:
• achieve GDP growth of 5 percent during 1991 to 1995
•

raise savings to 25 percent of GDP

•

reduce budget deficit from over 10 percent of GDP to 5 percent by 1995

•

reduce inflation from 17.7 percent to 10 percent by 1995 ( Kanyenze
2004 )

ESAP was implemented to achieve economic recovery and sustained growth
through balancing the budget, strengthening the private sector and removing
controls on trade. Growth in the 1990s under new macroeconomic policies was
a failure. Performance indicators show that the economy grew by a respectable
average of 4.3 percent per annum under the ‘bad’ control policies of the 1980s but
only by a miserable 0.8 percent under the so-called ‘good’ policies.23 The failure
to achieve the expected 5 percent growth rate under ESAP can be attributed to the
adverse effect on the manufacturing industry. Although liberalization was viewed
by many as positive, it had the effect of exposing the manufacturing industry to
foreign competition for which it was unprepared. The agricultural sector needed
22
23

The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe, Neither Growth Nor Equity. Carolyn Jenkins and John Knight p132
Macro-economic and Structural Adjustment Policies in Zimbabwe. Edited by C Mumbengegwi p 3
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the boost in exports and so it benefitted from ESAP. Local manufacturers of goods
such as clothing, however, faced fierce competition from cheap imports from
countries such as China and were also affected by the decline of real wages of
consumers. Some economists concluded that the collapse of ESAP was largely
due to the government’s failure to control public expenditure and financing of the
program through borrowing from domestic banks as opposed to other forms of
financing, e.g. taxation. Realizing that the general public was not satisfied with
ESAP the government decided to focus on fiscal discipline on the government’s
part. The next phase of economic recovery consisted of another set of policies
called the Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation
(ZIMPREST) from 1996 to 2000 that aimed at improving ESAP. Due to poor
fiscal policies, however, the budget deficit continued to grow and foreign currency
reserves remained low.
THE BEGINNING OF THE ECONOMIC DECLINE
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators
Indicator

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

GDP(current
US$ million)

8,135.8

12,882.6

17,875.6

7,913.1

4,712.1

3,372.5

7,033.7

GNP

7,150.0

12,800.0

30,800.0

7,850.0

4,640.0

3,180.0

n.a.

Population

12,595.0

12,698.0

12,786.0

12,863.0

12,936.0

13,010.0

13,085.0

Current
account
balance(as %
of GDP)

–0. 4

–1.0

–2.6

–4.6

–5.6

–7.5

-4.0

Fiscal deficit,
including
grants (% of
GDP)

–18.6

–7.0

–2.7

–0.2

–7.6

–6.1

–3.1

GNS per
GDP (%)

11.1

7.0

4.9

–1.4

–3.2

–6.7

4.0

Gross official
reserves
(months of
imports)

1.5

0.6

0.7

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

GDP growth
rates

–7.3

–2.7

–4.4

–10.4

–3.8

–6.5

–5.1

CPI inflation

55.6

73.4

133.2

365.0

350.0

237.8

1,216.0

Sources: African Development Bank database; IMF (for balance-of-payments
current account balance) – pg 12
Table 1 above looks at the key macroeconomic indicators. The figures appear
inconsistent partly because of the numerous currency conversions that took place
between 2005 to date. The Reserve Bank has removed zeros from the currency
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many times in an effort to manage inflation, so that when such efforts are made,
measures of GDP can be ambiguous if they do not account for these changes.
a) Civil unrest
In 1997, Zimbabwe’s economic decline began to visibly take place. It began with
the crash of the stock market on November 14, 1997. Civil society groups began
to agitate for their rights as these had been eroded under ESAP. In 1997 alone, 232
strikes were recorded, the largest number in any year since independence (Kanyenze
2004). During the first half of 1997, the war veterans organized themselves and
demonstrations that were initially ignored by the government. As the intensity of the
strikes grew, the government was forced to pay the war veterans a once-off gratuity
of ZWD $50,000 by December 31, 1997 and a monthly pension of $2,000USD
beginning January 1998 (Kanyenze 2004). To raise money for this unbudgeted
expense, the government tried to introduce a ‘war veterans’ levy,’ but they faced
much opposition from the labor force and had to effectively borrow money to meet
these obligations. Following the massive depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar
in 1997, the cost of agricultural inputs soared, undermining the viability of the
producers who in turn demanded that the producer price of maize (corn) be raised.
Millers then hiked prices by 24 percent in January 1998 by 24 percent and the
consequent increase in the price of maize meal triggered nation-wide riots during
the last month. The government intervened by introducing price controls on all
basic commodities. (Kanyenze 2004)
Many interventionist moves were undertaken to try to reverse some of the negative
effects of the Structural Adjustment Programs and to try to strengthen the private
sector that was suffering from decreasing output and increasing competition from
cheap imported products. Some of the most detrimental policies that followed
include:
b) War in the Democratic Republic of Congo
In a move widely criticized, Zimbabwe entered the war in the Democratic Republic
of Congo in 1998. Assessing the involvement of Zimbabwe’s troops in the war in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is evident that this was one of the pivotal
starting points of Zimbabwe’s economic decline. Zimbabwe aligned itself to the
government of Laurent Kabila and fought against the Tutsi rebels of the Rwandan
and Burundi forces. Some view the intervention in the war as a move by certain
individuals to enrich themselves through the illegal diamond industry that was
booming in the Congo.
The costs to Zimbabwe were estimated to have been almost 3 million USD per
day, and analysts state that the government spent ZWD 6 billion in unbudgeted
expenditure on the war.24 Although different sources quote ambiguous values for
government expenditure for that war, the values still reflect a large portion of the
budget. Many economists have viewed this as the beginning of the downfall of the
Zimbabwean economy due to increased unbudgeted government spending.
c) The Land Reform Program
24

http://www.hrforumzim.com/reports/tort990003/torture990003b.htm
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Commercial farming was one of the largest contributors to national income
and export earnings. The question of land ownership has for a long time been
in contention in Zimbabwe and it has always been an aim of the Zimbabwean
government to ensure equitable land ownership. ‘About 5,600 white commercial
farmers had access to 15.5 million hectares of land, while over 780,000 smallholder
farmers had to subsist on 16.4 million hectares of land. Whereas the average size
of a commercial farm was over 1,000 hectares, the average size of a communal
farm was less than 10
hectares.’25 This inequitable distribution of land was a result of the Lancaster
Agreement that was signed during Independence to protect white farmers from
losing their land under the new government. The agreement was to last for ten
years and assured white farmers that land would not be taken from them for land
resettlement programs without compensation. After 1990, the Lancaster Agreement
was no longer valid, and the government slowly began to redistribute land while
compensating the white farmers. According to many independent views, since the
Lancaster Agreement did not hold any longer, the government in 1994 began to
distribute the land that was set for resettlement, among the government ministers
and ruling party loyalists. By 1997, much of Zimbabwe’s very fertile land was
still in the hands of the thousands of white farmers that resided in Zimbabwe and
also now in the hands of government officials who were benefitting from initial
land redistribution efforts. In 2000, President Mugabe initiated the ‘Fast Track’
land reform program to redistribute land to the black majority. Many independent
critics view this as an unruly process that did not redistribute land within the
judicial framework. Farms were taken by force and many farmers were given a
one day ultimatum to evacuate their farms without prior warning. This project was
later relabeled the ‘Fast Track Land Reform program’ and was aimed at creating
51,000 new farmers. There was a huge disparity between the quality of farming
that took place on commercial farms and communal farms; many Zimbabwean
economists argue that this was due to property rights. Commercial farmers had
title deeds to the land and therefore had access to loans for equipment whereas
the black majority on communal farming areas suffered from the tragedy of the
commons. The government undertook the first of the white owned farm invasions
in a bid to reclaim land that was in the hands of the white minority. Hawkins
(2008) states however that the disorderly and hurried way in which the program
was carried out contributed greatly to a decrease in production. From then on,
agricultural output, which was once Zimbabwe’s pride, began to fall drastically.
In spite of falling tax revenues, civil servants’ salaries were increased. The budget
deficit progressively worsened from 5.5 percent of GDP in 1998 to 24.1 percent
by the end of 2000. The deficit had been targeted to decline to 3.8 percent of GDP
by the end of 2000.26
25
Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, A Discussion Paper UNDP and independent economists,
Zimbabwe 2008
26
Godfrey Kanyenze, The Zimbabwe Situation . www.zimbabwesituation.com
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By 2003, Zimbabwe’s economy was the fastest shrinking in the world, at 18
percent per year.27 The most detrimental effects of the land reform program on the
economy have been the following:
• Commercial farmers utilized economies of scale to achieve high yields
at the lowest possible costs. The Land Reform program redistributed
land by partitioning land into smaller farms, thereby eliminating this
cost-cutting mechanism.
• A tremendous drop in output has been recorded
To demonstrate this decline in output by looking at Table 2 below, wheat production
has declined from about 270, 000 tons in 1998 to 62,000 tons in 2007. There is a
wide variation between the production levels, but maize, tobacco and beef have
fallen by about a third of 1998 levels. The right hand side of the table shows the
proportion of the commodities that are still being produced by commercial farmers.
For example, although wheat and dairy production have fallen, the proportion of
these goods produced by commercial farmers has increased reflecting that small
holder production of these goods has decreased. Although the table states that
cotton production dropped to zero on a commercial scale in 2007, small scale
farmers had taken over the production of this crop.
Table 2: Decline in commercial agricultural production for selected
commodities between 1998 and 2007
Category

Crop

Commercial
Production

Percent of 1998
levels %

Tonnes(0000)
1998 2007
Food crops

Export and
plantation

Livestock

TOTAL

Proportion of
commercial
production in total
production
%
1998 2007

Percent
of 1998
levels %

Maize

521

160

31

36

23

63

Wheat

270

62

23

90

96

106

Soyabeans

113

64

57

99

95

96

Cotton

77

0

0

28

0

0

Tobbacco

210

65

31

97

88

92

Coffee

10

1

10

99

98

99

Tea

18

15

83

99

97

98

Sugar

553

384

69

97

96

98

Dairy

184

86

47

93

98

105

Beef

350

120

34

67

48

72

2306

957

42

Sources: Commercial Farmers’ Union
27
How the Loss of Property Rights caused Zimbabwe’s Collapse. Craig Richardson. November 14, 2005.
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9294
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•

The new farmers do not have access to loans. Due to the tightening
of the system, banks started becoming more reluctant to lend money
to individual farmers. This is because after the Land Reform Program,
banks had no mandate to lend to farmers as the farmers cannot use the
land as collateral.
• As a result of the lack of access to loans, the government has had to
hand out farming inputs including equipment and fertilizer, increasing
unbudgeted expenses
Today, the government argues that the agricultural sector has collapsed due
to the continuous effects of drought. In the Monetary Policy presented by the
Reserve Bank Governor, Food inflation poses the greatest challenge to efforts
to tame inflation. The situation has been exacerbated by projected lower than
normal output of grains as a result of incessant rains experienced during the
first half of the season and the very hot and dry weather experienced between
January and February, 2008 (Gono 2008). During the early 2000s, a drought hit
the southern African region, and the Zimbabwean government often refers to
this as one of the causes of Zimbabwe’s inflationary economy. The drought led
to lower tax revenues from the agricultural sector causing the budget deficit to
increase. But according to Figure 2, when the crisis began around 2000 annual
rainfall was significantly higher than the calculated average of 754mm. The
beginning of the crisis corresponds closely to the implementation of the land
reform program. One can therefore conclude that the drought alone was not
wholly responsible for the downturn in the Zimbabwean economy. Richardson
(2005) estimated that the land reform played a bigger role in creating the crisis
than the drought: ‘My econometric estimates indicate that the independent effect
of the land reforms, after controlling for rainfall, foreign aid, capital, and labor
productivity, led to a 12.5 percent annual decline in GDP growth for each of
the four years between 2000 and 2003. 13 The drop in rainfall in the 2001–02
growing season contributed to less than one-seventh of the overall downturn.
Without above-average rains, Zimbabwe’s economy would have been in even
worse shape, hard as that is to believe.’
Figure 1. Annual rainfall and GDP Growth
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Sources: Meteorological Services Department, Zimbabwe; and World Bank,
World Development Indicators (Washington: World Bank, 2002). 2003 is an
OECD estimate.
One of the main challenges associated with land reform in Zimbabwe is the fact
that although there was transference of land, there was no transference of skill
and knowledge about how to run these farms. The white farmers were forced to
leave the farms taking their managerial knowledge and in some cases their tools,
leaving the new breed of farmers with a piece of land and no skills to farm it.
In retrospect, would it have been more efficient if instead of partitioning these
farms, the government had allowed a tenancy situation whereby the white farmers
remain and offer their managerial skills and then the black majority would ‘rent’
some of the land? Such a form of private contracting might seem more desirous
because the economies of scale would not be lost and there would be no social
cost because of a lack of farming skills. Also larger farms are more resilient to
handle cyclical turns in the weather making this more efficient at least in the
short run until the new farmers acquire more knowledge and skills on large scale
farming.
When the economy does recover, how will the new farmers pay back these
subsidized loans they are currently receiving especially since many of them are
not using the land productively?
a) Quasi-Fiscal Activities (QFAs)
Quasi-fiscal expenditures by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe consist of unbudgeted
spending on government-led initiatives. These expenditures by the RBZ serve as
a substitute for international loans. Mackenzie and Stella (1996) define a QFA as
“an operation or measure carried out by a central bank or other public financial
institution with an effect that can, in principle, be duplicated by budgetary
measures in the form of an explicit tax, subsidy, or direct expenditure and that has
or may have an impact on the financial operations of the central bank, other public
financial institutions, or government.”28For the RBZ, seigniorage has fallen from
over 5 percent of GDP in 2001 to about 0.1 percent of GDP in 2005 because, given
very high rates of inflation, real base money has declined drastically in relation
to nominal GDP and the RBZ has invested in assets, including QFAs, with large
negative real interest rates.29 Here seigniorage can be considered to be the net
revenue earned from issuing currency, i.e. the difference between the production
cost and circulation cost of issuing currency and the interest earned on securities
when the securities are traded for notes. These QFAs consist of the following:
• subsidies to farmers and banks. These are accounted for as no-interest
receivables from the government on the ‘other assets’ part of the RBZ
balance sheet. The major subsidy programs have been to the agricultural
and public enterprise sectors through programs such as Agricultural
28
29

Sònia Muñoz, Central Bank Quasi-fiscal Losses and High Inflation in Zimbabwe: A Note
Sònia Muñoz, Central Bank Quasi-fiscal Losses and High Inflation in Zimbabwe: A Note
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•
•

Sector Enhancement Facility (ASPEF), the Productive Sector Facility
(PSF) and more recently Basic Commodity Supply Side Intervention
(BACOSSI) – which consisted of imported food hampers that were sold
at a highly subsidized rate.
losses from exchange rates as banks bought foreign currency from
exporters at higher price than they sold it to importers
losses due to the fact that foreign liabilities exceed foreign assets. Total
external debt increased from US 3,1 billion in 1991 to almost US 5
billion by 1997, before falling to US 3,5 billion by 2000. This decline
represents the drying up of traditional sources of external financing
following the fall-out with the IMF and subsequent withdrawal of
development partners. ( Kanyeze 2004)

Although the full extent of quasi fiscal activities is unknown, estimates by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put the overall financial borrowing
requirement at 64 percent of GDP in 2005, when the central budget deficit was
3 percent of GDP, implying a quasi-fiscal deficit of 61 percent of GDP and of 82
percent in 2006, when the central government deficit was 7.5 percent, indicating
a quasi-fiscal deficit in the region of three-quarters of GDP.30
Table 3: Zimbabwe Budget Balance 2007/2008

Estimated out-turn
(November 2007)
46.6

Actual out-turn

Revenue

Budget
(Dec 2006)
29.4

Expenditure

43.3

43.6

86.5

Deficit

13.9

+3.0(surplus)

+13.3(surplus)

Domestic Debt,
year end

0.176 (2006)

21,176 (2007)

+21.0 (increase)

$ Trillions

99.8

Sources:Government of Zimbabwe: Financial Statements 2008 Budget; Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe
IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
An inverse relationship exists between real income and inflation. As
inflation steadily rises in Zimbabwe, the average consumer’s real income is
drastically falling because wages are not keeping pace. A series of government
led initiatives to aid consumers proved to be counter-productive. In July 2007, the
government engaged in the implementation of price controls to ease the burden on
consumers. Because producers were not able to meet demand pressures, shortages
quickly arose. Consumers hoarded the cheaper goods that were now available;
producers incurred significant losses on selling goods at a price lower than the
30
Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, A Discussion Paper UNDP and independent economists,
Zimbabwe 2008
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market price $E, and queues for basic goods became the order of the day (as
shown in Figure 4 below). As a result, economic activity shifted to the informal
sector. According to independent estimates, 80 percent of economic activity is in
the informal sector, however, no formal studies have been made as it is difficult
to measure.
As a result of the inflationary pressures and price ceilings, the main effects were:
• a thriving parallel market
• shortages of basic goods
• informalization of the economy as Zimbabweans began to cross borders
to buy basic goods and sell them in foreign currency at a much higher
price.
Figure 2: Effects of a Price Ceiling
Price
Supply curve
$E
$x

Price ceiling

Q1

Q2

Shortage

Demand Curve
Quantity

HYPERINFLATION
In the last decade Zimbabwe experienced chronic high inflation which exploded
into hyperinflation in 2006-2007.
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HOW HYPERINFLATION OCCURS
Figure 3: The process of hyperinflation
			
Shock to the
system
‐political,
economic,
domestic,
external

Increased
Increase
budget
d budget
deficit
deficit

Money
creation

Dollarizatio
Dollarization
n

Inflation

Decrease
in money
demand
Olivera‐
Tanzi effect

As shown in Fig. 3 above, the phenomenon of hyperinflation is always triggered
when an economic system faces a shock, be it external, political, or domestic.
In many cases, such an unprecedented shock leads governments to spend more
money than they receive from revenues, thereby increasing the budget deficit.
In the case of Zimbabwe, the shock consisted of the war veterans’ gratuities in
1997 and subsequently, the participation of Zimbabwean armed forces in the DRC
war.
High inflation in Zimbabwe has been fueled by a rapidly growing money supply
reflecting growing fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits. Quasi-fiscal losses have
increased greatly since 2004, due to huge foreign exchange subsidies to public
enterprises and government, price supports to exporters (to compensate them
partially for the highly overvalued exchange rate), and interest payments on open
market operations. 31 In August 2006 Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rose above
1,000 percent, dramatizing the severity of its economic crisis. Redenominated
notes were issued in August so that 1,000 old Zimbabwean dollars become one
new dollar. The annual inflation rate, already the highest in the world, raced to
1,729.9 per cent in February 2007 from 1,593.6 per cent the previous month.
On a monthly basis, however, inflation slowed to 37.8 percent from January’s
45.4 percent. The inflation rate dropped momentarily due to the artificial effect of
price controls to alleviate the suffering of many Zimbabweans. The controls led to
hoarding of goods, however, and even longer lines for basic goods. Manufacturers
were forced to close businesses as they were incurring huge losses.
In 2007 government spending increased once again in real terms. In the budget
announcement, there was no mention of ways to lower the Quasi-Fiscal Activities
31
IMF Working Paper. Lessons from High Inflation Episodes for Stabilizing the Economy in Zimbabwe
WP0799
121

and the budget made very little accommodations for QFAs. In June of the same year,
the government adopted price freezes, followed by a wage freeze 2 months later.
According to the government, inflation dropped to 6,592.8 percent in August from
7,634.8 percent in July. Queues for basic goods became a common characteristic,
as consumers hoarded products after price reductions leading to shortages of
basic goods. This in turn, causes the parallel market to thrive, as individuals
choose to engage in ‘cross-border trading’ – buying goods in neighboring South
Africa, Botswana or Zambia and selling them on the parallel market at much
higher prices. In 2007, the hyperinflation was really biting the pockets of the
ordinary man on the streets. In an effort to cushion the general consumer from the
deteriorating value of his money, the government implemented price controls on
all basic goods. However, these controls backfired as the general public rushed
to hoard the incredibly cheap goods and any profits that the manufacturers were
making were inevitably eroded resulting in many of them being forced to stop
production.
Expectations of inflation also fuel the crisis. Because people see the prices rising,
they expect them to continue to do so in the future. The more chronic people’s
expectations are of an increase in inflation, the more they adapt their behavior
to fit those expectations. People begin to get rid of their money more quickly,
causing prices to rise faster.
It is also common knowledge to all Zimbabweans, that for many years, the
Zimbabwean dollar has been overvalued. For example, in 2007, the official rate
was still 250 ZWD to one USD, yet the USD was trading at hundreds of thousands
of Zimbabwean dollars on the parallel market. This posed a huge problem, in that
only those in influential positions who had access to this rate were able to acquire
foreign currency from the banks for such a cheap rate and were therefore able to
finance lavish lifestyles and trips abroad. Consequently, one would find that some
members of the population were not eager to see the crisis being resolved as they
were benefitting from it greatly. Also, producers of goods are required to sell
some of their foreign currency to the Reserve Bank at a much lower rate than they
would be able to acquire on the parallel market.
One of the main hindrances to reducing hyperinflation in Zimbabwe is the
recurring wave of political instability that have resulted in a loss of investor
confidence and caused many foreign investors to pull out of the country, citing
that the environment is unstable, unpredictable and risky. The Indigenization
Bill that was passed in Parliament that aims at shifting 51% of ownership of
companies into the hands of Zimbabweans has been criticized by some as
adversely affecting investor relations within the global economy. Analysts argue
that foreign-owned companies will not be willing to invest in a country where
their companies have the potential to be nationalized. This results in a reduction
of foreign currency in the economy. Fig. 3 demonstrates the above as events in
1997 shocked the system, driving the government to achieving a much higher
budget deficit. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has over the years been engaged
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in rapid money supply, for example, increasing M3 supply from 1 638.4% in
January 2007 to 51 768.8 in November 2007 (Gono 2008), further fuelling
inflation.
EMERGENCE OF A PARALLEL MARKET AND MULTIPLE EXCHANGE
RATES
As can be expected of a hyperinflationary environment, black market for foreign
currency and basic goods that are either not available in stores or too expensive to
buy, is now the most reliable source of goods. Having returned home this summer
to conduct informational interviews, I discovered that individuals and businesses
alike could not access foreign currency from any banks and had to resort to
securing this money from the parallel market, which consists of many skilled
laborers who have had to move from formal employment to become informal
traders as their formal wages were being eroded by hyperinflation. The main
currencies that are traded are the South African rand, the Botswana Pula and the
United States dollar.
Every day as I travelled through the streets of the capital city, I encountered many
traders who typically stood by the side of the road and solicited deals by whispering
to passers-by, “I can help you change your money to Rands, US dollars or pulas.”
Having just come from the States and in desperate need of the local currency, I
‘shopped around’ for the best Zimbabwean dollar rate that I could get for my US
dollars. After some screening, I found one trader who I thought seemed slightly
trustworthy, and decided to trade with him. In a bid to be as discreet as possible,
he took me up many flights of stairs of a nearby building, to a room that was filled
with other traders, and where massive amounts of different currencies were trading
hands. He quickly handed me the equivalent Zimbabwean dollar amount that I
required, took my US dollars and immediately began trading with the person next
to him who was looking for US dollars. And that was it, I had my foreign currency
and he had made a huge profit by selling me trillions of Zimbabwean dollars that
would be worthless by the next morning and obtaining the stable US dollar. Daily,
the ordinary Zimbabwean is forced to engage in such illegal acts because foreign
currency and goods are readily available on the parallel market. The parallel market
is the most desirable choice because it is the most efficient market in Zimbabwe
currently. It avoids the hassles of applying for bank drafts for foreign currency that
are never approved; it is very responsive to changes in demand for foreign currency
and very responsive to what is happening in the media. For example, when the
Reserve Bank requires foreign currency for a project, usually a QFA, they have
no alternative but to get the money from the parallel market. Since the bank buys
the foreign currency in bulk, supply of foreign currency in the market decreases,
pushing up the trading rate for that day. Other drivers of the market included the
recent talks between the political parties that sent the rates shooting downwards as
optimism filled the market. At the first signs of collapse between the two parties,
however the ZWD to USD exchange rates shot up tremendously.
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The major problem with foreign currency in Zimbabwe is the fact that there are
multiple exchange rates (six in August 2008 – the cash rate, the transfer rate,
the UN rate, the Old Mutual rate, the Inter-bank rate, the government rate). The
reason behind multiple exchange rates lies in the fact that the government holds
the government exchange rate at an extremely artificially low rate that no one
can access except government officials, giving them no incentive to eliminate
this overvaluation and inequity. Those who can access foreign currency at very
reduced rates buy it and then sell it at mark-up prices of up to four thousand
percent. This arbitrage, backed by the population’s inflation expectations, results
in rapidly increasing prices. Because there are very limited exports, much of
Zimbabwe’s foreign currency comes in from remittances sent to families by the
workers in the Diaspora.
It will be interesting to see what becomes of the many illegal foreign currency
dealers who have amassed a large amount if foreign currency when the economy
recovers.
EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS
Currently the Zimbabwean economy is being run by the informal sector. At least
eighty percent of the economy uses foreign currency, but there is still a huge
demand for Zimbabwean dollars because until recently, most stores were not
allowed to legally sell their goods in foreign currency. As a result, most official
transactions occur in Zimbabwean dollars leading to a great demand of the local
currency. Many companies have been forced to close shops and service providers
such as schools are being forced to charge their fees either in US dollars or in
fuel coupons, especially when world oil prices are going up. This is very rational
behavior especially now that the US faces the threat of going into a recession;
the next best way for companies to store value is to charge in foreign currency.
If the government was keen, they could possibly initiate a very sophisticated
form of dollarization, where they used these fuel coupons as currency to restore
the public’s confidence in some form of storage. The government is reluctant
to dollarize using the South African rand because of the politics in the region.
Because of these various factors, people in Zimbabwe generally like to keep their
money in non-monetary assets or in foreign currency, mainly the British pound,
the US dollar and the South African rand (ZAR). Because of the economic crisis,
millions of Zimbabweans are now in the Diaspora, hoping that the remittances they
send through agents such as Western Union will alleviate the families suffering
from the hyperinflation.
The policies that have been adopted so far in Zimbabwe have proven to be
ineffective as these target the effects and not the causes. These measures, which
include price controls and price freezes, only provide very temporary alleviation
from the suffering but are ineffective in the long term. Price controls, imposed in
Zimbabwe in 2007, faced two major obstacles: the first was to set prices for all
prices of consumer goods, intermediate goods and raw materials in the economy;
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the second was to adjust them to scarcities and surpluses. Since the first problem
made the goal of controlling ‘all’ prices impossible, government usually set prices
for a basket of consumer goods. But that created another set of problems since
producers of these products had their prices controlled but not their inputs. Profit
margins disappeared and, sooner or later, the products themselves.32 Price freezes,
which were adopted in August 2006 in Zimbabwe, aim at keeping the prices of all
goods stagnant. This measure is usually difficult to adopt as it requires shops to
be monitored or for shop owners to submit a list of their prices every so often, but
this is not feasible as it is time consuming and gives way to corruption.
As the economic crisis deepens, and the general discontent grows, the Zimbabwean
power making forces are becoming highly centralized due to the mistrust and
elitism that characterizes the current regime. Many major political and economic
decisions are controlled by a few in power, which is similar to the economic
conditions of Russia under Brezhnev.
POSSIBLE MACRO-ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS
Different solutions have been presented, including recommendations by US
economist Steve Hanke. In his paper, titled Zimbabwe, From Hyperinflation to
Growth, Hanke argues that if Zimbabwe adopts certain principles, it could well
be on the road to recovery. His suggestions include dollarization of the economy,
which would effectively result in Zimbabwe adopting the US dollar or the South
African rand as the official currency. As of September 2008, the Zimbabwean
economy moved to partial dollarization with the Reserve bank approving a few
licensed producers to sell their goods in foreign currency. Local economists
have criticized suggestions to dollarize because in the cases where dollarization
has taken place, the economies have been very small and undiversified such as
Lesotho that now uses the South African rand. Although it might not be that
apparent, Zimbabwe’s economy is very diversified. Zimbabwe was ranked among
many middle income countries such as Turkey, Singapore, Malaysia and Nigeria
in the 1970’s and used to engage in trade with the US and Europe. Zimbabwe
had the fourth strongest economy in the world. With this in mind, many feel that
eradicating the multiple exchange rates would be more desirable.
Steve Hanke also suggests that Zimbabwe adopts a currency board and a free
banking system where banks freely issue notes with minimum government
regulation as opposed to the Reserve Bank handling that responsibility. This is
because when the state intervenes in note issues, it crowds out competition and
forces everyone to accept the quality of service set by the state, and this limits
flexibility if choice. Also in the case where by too many notes are issued, the
public will have a difficult time getting rid of an over issue of notes.
While conducting my research, I discovered that many Zimbabwean economists
were of the opinion that although credible, Steve Hanke’s proposals would
not function in Zimbabwe, because they do not take into account the political
32
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economy. They preferred a more comprehensive macro-economic reform strategy
that corrects that corrects the pricing side, that tackles government expenditure,
liberalizes the one-sided judicial system, and reduces inflation expectations by
restoring confidence in the general public. How that will be done is yet to be seen,
but in the case of Zimbabwe, one cannot separate the politics and the economics
as the two go hand in hand.
After careful analysis, I propose that although the ultimate solution in Zimbabwe
must begin with a political settlement. However, in between now and a political
settlement much can be done in the short-term to remedy the current crisis.
• Short term solutions
One problem in Zimbabwe is that the accurate measure of the value of goods
is distorted by people’s inflation expectations; therefore each retailer sells
goods at above the real value of the good, so as to evade losses incurred from
hyperinflationary pressures.
To tackle this problem in the short term, the government could adopt a store of
value that is appreciating in value as the official medium of exchange. A good
example of this could be fuel coupons. However, given the current financial crisis,
and the lack of access to credit, demand for gas has decreased sharply, causing
oil prices per barrel to drop significantly since July 2008. Regardless of this fact,
once the global economy recovers from the worst of the recession period, oil
prices will begin to stabilize.
Another way to curb the unprecedented increase in prices and to restore consumer
confidence is to re-introduce price controls on goods charged in foreign currency.
Since the government has recently moved to allowing partial dollarization of
the economy by letting licensed retailers sell their goods in foreign currency,
they should impose price caps on the prices of basic goods because retailers are
still inflating prices even though their revenue is in the form of stable foreign
currencies.
It is worth noting that these minor remedies will not be able to effect much change
in the production sector of Zimbabwe. The intractable problem of output can only
be solved by restoration of investor confidence, and a monetary boost from bodies
such as the IMF. Policy recommendations that examine the economic decline and
hyperinflation as solely an economic problem under represent the severity of the
crisis. Short term solutions exist, but are ultimately inadequate.
• Long term solutions
In the long term, once the political impasse has been resolved, the government
can put in place a comprehensive macro-economic stabilization policy that
encompasses all sectors of the economy. According to the IMF, there are 5 key
elements necessary in ensuring that Zimbabwe achieves reasonable stabilization:
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1. Transparent transfer of quasi-fiscal activities to the government budget,

as announced by the 2007 budget. 33No entity outside the budget should
undertake any activity of a fiscal nature (including interest payments,
subsidized credits etc) without offsetting transfers transparently provided
for in the budget. Although this would not reduce inflation, it would allow
for increased transparency and accountability and the rigor with which fiscal
actions are reviewed would also be applied to these measures.
2. Substantial fiscal tightening, including the newly absorbed QFAs of the
RBZ or any other entity.34For example, to lower inflation by about 800
percentage points, it was found that a minor adjustment of at least 10
percentage points of GDP would be necessary, based on 2006 figures. This
must be complemented by government reduction of the government wage
bill, and reduction of capital expenditure which more than doubled in 2006.
3. Liberalizing the exchange regime by unifying the exchange rate and
removing restrictions on current international payments and transfers. 35
This would involve the devaluation of the interbank exchange rate, pegging
it closer and closer to the parallel market rate. Only one exchange rate must
be in operation.
4. Deregulating prices and imposing a hard budget constraint on public
enterprises.36 (Enterprises need a hard budget constraint that requires
them to cut costs and operate at present levels of budget subsidies
and agreed pricing formulas. Deregulating prices and allowing public
enterprises to introduce cost-recovery pricing would be an essential element
of a plan to move the operation of these enterprises to a commercial footing.
Price deregulation would likely lead to a one-off spike in prices, but strong
fiscal adjustment would ultimately reduce inflation pressures.)
5. Establishing a strong money anchor to reduce inflation and inflation
expectations.37
From many cases of inflation that have been studies, it has been concluded
that output levels can be restored fairly quickly, within the first two years of
stabilization. In the case of Zimbabwe, maintaining the growth in output will
depend on addressing a few factors including public enterprise and civil service
reform, central bank reform, public expenditure and tax reform to sustain the
fiscal adjustment and stimulate output growth.38
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Although there is lack of external support, Zimbabwe could begin an effective
stabilization program with assistance in the form of policy measures from
external bodies.
In conclusion, it is clear that most of the government policies although intended
for the public good ignored the social costs associated and were not carried out
in the most efficient, transparent manner. The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe
would probably be the quickest to revive as it requires basic knowledge and
minimum skills and it is not dependent on other factors of production besides
inputs, good rain and knowledge. Manufacturing on the other hand will be slower
to recover because it is partly dependent on the agricultural sector and requires
a greater number of skilled labor, most of whom have left the country. Mining
and tourism are also strong areas with the fastest growth potential as soon as
investor confidence is restored in Zimbabwe. However, Zimbabwe first needs to
re-examine its political condition, before any long-term stabilization effort can be
put in place.
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